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Binder: Publicity Rights and Defamation of the Deceased: Resurrection or

CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND DEFAMATION OF
THE DECEASED: RESURRECTION OR R.I.P.?
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Elvis Presley was a pedophile.",
Had this statement been communicated in such manner during
Elvis's lifetime, he would have been able to sue for defamation,
with a favorable chance of success (provided that he would be able
to meet the appropriate elements of the action).2 Yet, courts in
civil proceedings have consistently refused to grant a similar cause
of action for postmortem defamation; and, save a small legion of
hopeful fans, it is widely recognized that Elvis is in fact deceased
Thus Elvis, or rather his estate, would have little hope of civil
recourse against any directed defamatory remarks published today.
However, if one were to print that Elvis was a pedophile on Tshirts and then sell them, or even place his name or likeness,
absent any potential defamatory statements, on leaflets and
distribute them, his estate, in certain jurisdictions, would be able to
sue on the grounds that such an action was an infringement on his
publicity rights.4 Unlike defamation of the dead, in which courts
1. Let it be known that at no time during the course of research for this paper
did this author encounter any material even slightly suggesting that Elvis was
indeed a pedophile.
2. See generallyNew York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In this string of jurisprudence, the Untied
States Supreme Court established its defamation doctrine, which provides that,
absent a finding of actual malice, the First Amendment protects defamatory
statements directed at public officials and figures. These cases will be given
greater attention in Section IH-A, infra.
3. See Philip Wittenberg, DANGEROUS WORDS 209 (1947) (stating that "[i]n
nearly every state in the Union there is a law making libel of the dead a crime,
but the unanimous rule in civil cases bars recovery").
4. There is, in fact, an entire body of Elvis Law in which his estate has
initiated litigation against both individuals and entities for using his name or
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commonly do not recognize such a cause of action for damages,
descendible publicity rights granting relief to the deceased's estate
for appropriation of name or likeness are acknowledged by some
states.5
To allow descendible publicity rights while prohibiting a cause
of action for defamation of the dead, suggests that not only do the
departed retain an interest in their identity, but that they must also
preserve a layer of skin thick enough to withstand defamatory
attacks against their immortal reputation. This is an inconsistent
treatment of the dead as it, in a sense, resurrects the person for
certain causes of action when identity is at stake while adding
another nail to the coffin for other identity-related matters. The
reputation of the deceased should either die with the being, thereby
precluding any defamation or publicity actions, or exist beyond the
grave in such a way as to receive congruent treatment to that of a
living person. This paper is a prayer to harmonize the treatment of
the dead with respect to publicity and defamation concerns. Part II
examines the notion of a descendible publicity right. In particular,
this section will focus on how this right is often seen as a
derivation of certain privacy rights. Part III provides an overview
of defamation law as it applies to the deceased. Specifically, this
section will examine the common law holdings, as well as certain
criminal statutes that do in fact outlaw defamation of the dead. In
its attempt to reconcile these differences in which the dead are
viewed, Part IV will initially address the topics of survivability and
likeness for a particular purpose. See e.g. Hoffman v. Capital Cities, 255 F. 3d
1180 (9h' Cir. 2001) (concerning the "Jail House Rock" persona); Brewer v.
Producers Video Inc., 216 F. 3d 1281 (11 t Cir. 2000) (concerning a television
special dealing with Elvis from his death to the present); Elvis Presley Enters.
V. Capece, 141 F. 3d 188 (5 h Cir. 1998) (concerning the "Velvet Elvis"
nightclub); State ex. rel. Elvis Presley Int'l v. Crowell, 773 S.W. 2d 89 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987) (concerning an organization named after Elvis); Estate of
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981) (concerning an Elvis

impersonator); Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.
2d 956 (6h Cir.. 1980) (concerning little pewter Elvis dolls); Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F. 2d 215 (2 nd Cir. 1978) (concerning a Elvis memorial
poster).
5. See e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (1999).
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wrongful death before examining a uniform treatment of the dead.
By suggesting that legal jurisdictions "put both feet in the grave,"
this section will argue that posthumous publicity and reputation
actions should remain with the deceased.
II.

GRATEFUL DEAD? DESCENDIBLE PUBLICITY RIGHTS

Dead celebrities in some jurisdictions should consider
themselves fortunate. Despite the fact that they are biologically no
more, their identity continues to thrive from beyond the grave.
Where, in the course of life, celebrities are able to use their names
and likenesses as a source of wealth and influence, some states
have extended this right of publicity into the afterlife, as well.6
Thus someone's persona is able to achieve, in a sense, the
American Dream Plus; that is, to be able to generate fame and
wealth not only in life but also in death.
The right of publicity is the "right of every person to control the
commercial use of his or her identity." 7 Even though this right
speaks to "every person," publicity rights are typically reserved for
celebrities.8 This inadvertent exclusion of lay people stems from
the idea that right of publicity primarily serves to protect the
commercial value of one's name or likeness.9 Generally, the name
or likeness of non-celebrities holds little, if any commercial
appeal.'0 Though, what is now regarded as a property interest for
celebrities, the right of publicity has its roots in the right to
Therefore, it is
privacy, which is unconditional to fame."
6. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as CommercialProperty:
The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 129, 132 (1993).
7. See id. at 130.
8. See Brent W. Stricker, In Memory of Lost Heroes: Protectingthe Persona
Rights ofDeceased Celebrities,31 McGEORGE L. REv. 611, 613 (2000).
9. See generally id.
10. This notion has even prompted one state to codify a publicity cause of
action that excludes 'all non-celebrities. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3344 et seq.
(West Supp. 1999) (providing that celebrities, in life and death, have a property
interest in their personae).
11. See generally Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image, 81
CAL. L. REv. 125, 147-78 (chronicling the emergence of a right of publicity).
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important to investigate the upbringing of publicity rights before
attending to descendible publicity.
A.

PrivacyActions ofAppropriationand the Emergence of
Publicity Rights

Invasion of privacy actions are but a mere patch of five 'o'clock
shadow-fresh growth, if you will-on the face of tort law. That
is, prior to 1890, no common law court had ever granted relief
solely based upon such a cause of action. 2 It was in that year that
two young Boston lawyers named Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis collaborated on an article that synthesized the notion of
privacy into a legal action and thus spawned an entirely new
branch of tort law. 3 The article, entitled "The Right to Privacy"
and published in the Harvard Law Review, 4 arose out of a general
animus the authors garnered toward the press' increasing
infatuation with individuals' private lives. 5 Warren and Brandeis
sought to address both the growing number of liberties taken by
the newspapers in publishing "idle gossip" and the need to tether
the press away from private matters. 6 Shortly thereafter, the first
American decisions willing to accept this notion of invasion of
However, the right of publicity as being derived from privacy rights is not a
universally accepted conclusion. Some commentators have suggested that
publicity rights originated in unfair competition laws. See Gary M. Ropski,
Celebrity Status and Right of Publicity, NEW YORK L. JOURN., Jan. 31, 1997, at
5; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995)
(providing a right of publicity).

12. See PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS, § 117 at 849.
13. See Don R. Pember, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 20-32 (1972).
Shortly after the Warren and Brandeis article was published, privacy-type
claims thickened in the East. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, at 850, fn.
10 (noting that "[t]he first case to allow recovery on the independent basis of the
right of privacy was an unreported decision..., where an actress very
scandalously appeared on the stage in tights, and the defendant snapped her
picture.... and was enjoined from publishing it").

14. See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV.193 (1890).
15. See Pember, supra note 13, at 23.
16. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 14, at 196.
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privacy as a legal principle followed. 7 Since then, the law has
evolved into four different causes of action continuingly rooted to
the right of privacy: (1) Appropriation of likeness; (2)
unreasonable intrusion into areas of private concerns; (3) public
disclosure of private facts; and (4) false light publication. 8
Appropriation is the first type of invasion of privacy action to be
recognized by courts. 9 Essentially, this form of invasion provides
a cause of action to a plaintiff whose name or likeness has been
used, or appropriated, without consent.2" Not unlike defamation,"'
plaintiffs in appropriation actions must show that the name or
likeness used by the defendant was indicative of their character
and not purely coincidental.'
That is, a woman with
distinguishing blonde hair grown down past her knees may not sue
for appropriation of her likeness if a woman of similar hair length
is coincidently featured in a shampoo commercial.'

17. For a list of early privacy cases, see Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, §
117 atfa. 10.
18. See John w. Wade, Developing Trends in the Tort Action for Invasion of
the Right of Privacy, 16 VA. L. WEEKLY, DICTA CoMP. 1, 7-12 (1965); Prosser
and Keaton, supra note 12, § 117 at 851-66.
19. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 117 at 851.
Because the right of publicity is often viewed as a derivation of appropriation
causes of action, this article will examine only this branch of the right of privacy
tort. For discussion relating to the other three braches, see Prosser and Keaton,
supranote 12, § 117 at 854-66; Wade, supra note 18, at 7-12.
20. See id. 851-52.
Definitions of appropriation have differed in their wording, but remain
consistent in spirit. See e.g. Wade, supra note 18, at 7-8 (stating that
"commercial appropriation of some aspect of the plaintiff's personality" is an
invasion of privacy).
21. See Section I-B-1, infra.
22. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 117 at 852-53. "It is the
plaintiffs name as a symbol of identity that is involved here, and not as a mere
name." Id. at 852.
23. Similarly, a one Humphrey Widdlethorpe may not be granted relief if his
name happened to appear in a novel coincidently and without any indication of
his identity. See e.g. People on Complaint of Maggio v. Charles Scribner's
Sons, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 514 (1954) (in which the same name as the plaintiffs is
used in a novel).
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One of the first appellate cases concerning appropriation was
Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Company. 4 In Roberson, the
defendant placed a picture of a beautiful woman (who was not a
celebrity) on widely circulated lithographs advertising flour.2 ' The
court in a 4-3 decision outright rejected the, then novel, invasion of
privacy claim.26 In doing so, the court found that, absent "a clever
article in the Harvard Law Review," there was a lack of precedent
and other legal material on which to base an affirmative decision.
The court, additionally, forecasted "a vast amount of litigation...
bordering upon the absurd" if such a right were to be embraced. 7
And, in a further attempt to accredit its hesitation to accept the
right to privacy as a legal principle, the court expressed its fear of
appropriately distinguishing between what is public and what is
private, as well as, the potential undue burden placed on the
freedom of speech and press.28 With the Roberson decision, the
invasion of privacy tort was not exactly steadfast out of the gates.29
24. See 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1902).
25. See id. at 442. The plaintiff claimed that he had been "greatly humiliated

by the scoffs and jeers of persons who have recognized her face and picture on
this advertisement and her good name has been attacked, causing her great
distress and suffering both in body and mind; that she was made sick and
suffered a severe nervous shock, was confined to her bed and compelled to
employ a physician." Id.

Instead of detailing all of her maladies, if such an action was to arise today, all
she would have to advance is that the defendant appropriated her likeness.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id; see also Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 117 at 850.

Such fears are certainly justifiable, as courts today continue to encounter issues
of private versus public and limitations on First Amendment freedoms. See
generally Lois G. Forer, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL
AND INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987)
(providing in-depth coverage on the effect defamation and privacy actions have
on speech and press liberties).
29. In fact, so much controversy surrounded the Roberson decision that one

of the concurring judges submitted a law article in its defense. See O'Brien, The
Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902). And consequently, New York

enacted a statute "making it both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the
name, portrait or picture of any person for 'advertising purposes or for the
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Understandably so, the first courts to hear such matters were
"preoccupied with the question whether the right of privacy
existed at all."3
As more cases were decided, however,
appropriation jurisprudence began to stabilize and thus form the
law as we know today.31
Because appropriation concerns the use of an individual's name
or likeness, often in a commercial or profit-minded sense, it
naturally follows that celebrities, whose names and likenesses are
used to sell and empower products, appear frequently as plaintiffs
in such actions.32 The difference between the celebrity and the
non-celebrity plaintiff in appropriation actions is quite
distinguishable. A non-celebrity plaintiff, similar to the woman
Roberson whose name or likeness accompanies a commercial
endeavor, asserts claims that are more akin to the traditional notion
of privacy as a "right to be let alone."33 Such plaintiffs are
"plucked from obscurity and rudely exposed to widespread and
unwanted publicity."3 4 However for a celebrity, who has already
been injected into the pubic eye and is accustomed to braving the
purposes of trade."' See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12 § 117 at 850-51
(quoting N.Y. Civil Rights Law, §§50-51 (1921)).
30. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 117 at 851.
31. The leading case of this movement, which rejected the holding in
Robinson and adopted the views of Warren and Brandeis was Pavesich v. New
EnglandLife Insurance Company. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (concerning the use of
the plaintiff's picture without consent in newspaper advertisements). For further
examples of appropriation cases, see e.g. Manger v. Kree Institute of
Electrolysis, Inc. 233 F. 2d 5 ( 2 nd Cir. 1956) (in which a plaintiffs name was
appropriated without consent); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55
(N.C. 1938) (in which the plaintiff's likeness was appropriated without
consent); Eick v. Perk Dog Food, Co., 106 N.E. 2d 742 (Ill. App. 1952) (in
which a plaintiffs picture was appropriated without consent); Young v.
Greneker Studios, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 357 (1941) (in which a plaintiffs likeness was
used as a model for a mannequin without consent).
32. "It is an unquestioned fact that the use of a prominent person's name,
photograph or likeness.., in advertising a product or in attracting an audience
is of great pecuniary value." Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB.

203, 215-16 (1954).

33. See Madow, supra note 11, at 168.
34. See id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

7

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

304

DEPA UL J. ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XII:297

elements of publicity, to complain of additional publicity may
A celebrity's
seem rather inexplicable to a finder of fact."
grievance is not so much that his name or likeness had been
appropriated without consent, but rather that such use went
With this, the right of publicity has thus
uncompensated."
emerged, separating itself from the privacy action of
37
appropriation.
Although lawsuits in which public figures have claimed
appropriation of name or likeness have dated as far back as the late
nineteenth century,38 it was not until 1953 when "the right of
publicity" was initially phrased and the "economic conception of
fame" was thus legally realized.39 In Haelan Laboratories,Inc., v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that, "in addition to and independent of'
the traditional notion of invasion of privacy by appropriation, there
also existed a "right of publicity" granting individuals-namely
prominent ones-protection for their personas." While Haelen
35. See id. at 168-69. "How could Babe Ruth, who had performed before
thousands of people, ... and endorsed products, complain of distress or
humiliation when his picture was used without his consent on a baseball
card..." Id. at 169.
36. See id.
37. In another sense, Professor Madow stated: "The right of publicity was
created not so much form the right of privacy as from frustration with it." Id. at
167; but see McCarthy , supra note 6, at 134 (stating that "the right of publicity
grew out of the rights of privacy").
In a now-famous case concerning the news broadcast of a man being shot from
a cannon, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that the right of
publicity was distinct from the right to privacy. See Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that broadcasting the
footage was an infringement on the plaintiffs right of publicity).
38. See e.g. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 372 (Mich. 1899)
(in which the defendant named a brand of cigars after a deceased public figure).
39. See Haelan Lab. Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F. 2d 866 (2 nd
Cir. 1953). "Economic conception of fame" was termed by Professor Madow,
supra note 11, at 172.
40. See HalelanLab., 202 F. 2d at 866. Both plaintiff and defendant in this
case were chewing gum manufacturers that wanted to use photographs of certain
baseball players for their product. The plaintiff contended that it had exclusive
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Laboratorieswas still fresh in the minds of legal scholars Melville
Nimmer channeled its momentum into a determinative law article
chronicling the inadequate legal doctrine available to protect the
commercial interest celebrities have in their personas and urging
for the continued recognition of the Second Circuit's "right of
publicity."4 In the article, Nimmer fashioned his proposal in the
clothing of-what one professor referred to as-"moral
principle." What is meant by "moral principle" is clear:
Celebrities and other prominent figures have traditionally
worked hard to achieve such a status. 3 In doing so, their personas
evolve into marketable assets. For compensation, they may lend
their voice, or name, or image (i.e. some distinguishable element
of their famed identity) as endorsement for any number of
commodities ranging from airlines to zydeco music. In a sense,
they "reap the fruits of their labors." Therefore, to allow others to
exploit a celebrity's marketable identity for the sake of commercial
benefit is an exercise in injustice, (i.e. they "reap where they have
not sown")."
Certainly, this is not the exclusive philosophy advanced in
support of publicity rights. It is, however, the most prolific and,
more importantly, the most material to this paper, as it signifies the
right of publicity as a laboriously achieved property right.45

rights to the photographs. The defendant argued that the ballplayers had merely
a privacy interest in their photographs, which was considered personal and thus
nontransferable. See id. 867.
41. See generally Nimmer, supra note 32.
42. To do so, Madow stated, "would be more acceptable to courts and
legislatures, as well as the general public.. ." See Madow, supra note 11, at
174-75 (citing to Nimmer, supra note 32, at 215-16).
43. Certainly, this is not entirely accurate. There are those odd occasions
when certain individuals, like Kato Kaelin, seem to serendipitously achieve
stardom. But we'll leave this issue resting for another paper.
44. See Madow, supra note 11, at 178. "A labor-based moral argument for
publicity rights presupposes that commercially marketable fame is no mere gift
of the gods." Id. at 182.
45. See id. at 181 "The basis most frequently and confidently advanced by
courts and commentators is the labor theory on which Nimmer originally
relied." Id.
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B. DescendiblePublicityRights
Despite its "breakthrough" acknowledgment of the right of
publicity in Haelan Laboratories,the Second Circuit flatly refused
to answer the question of whether this right was a "property right."
It dismissed it as "immaterial" and further stated: "[T]he tag
'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim
that has pecuniary worth."4 Dean Prosser and Professor Keaton
have echoed similar sentiment: "It seems quite pointless to dispute
over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property;' it is at
least clearly proprietary in nature."47 Fair enough-at least for
cases that involve the living who, arguably, tend to sue on their
own behalf. But what about those cases involving the deceased
whose interests are furthered by their estates or descendents?
The right to privacy is considered a personal interest designed to
prevent emotional injury as a result of the appropriation of one's
identity for commercial use and is therefore not descendible.48
Property rights, however, are typically descendible.49 And while
most scholars would agree that the right of publicity in securing
one's identity from commercial exploitation is, in fact a
proprietary interest," jurisdictions have been plagued by
inconsistency as to whether such a right is passed on to surviving
Further justifications supporting publicity rights, as provided by Professor
Madow, include: Economic arguments, in which incentives are necessary "to
stimulate creative effort and achievement," and consumer protection arguments,
i.e. "promot[ing] the flow of useful information about goods and services to
consumers..." See id. at 178-79.
46. See Haelen Lab., 202 F. 2d at 868.
47. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, at 854.
48. See Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 128 N.Y.S. 247 (1911); see also
McCarthy, supra note 6, at 134 (stating that in personal rights, the "damage is to
human dignity... and causally connected to mental distress").
49. For example, a tangible piece of property, such as Blackacre, could be
considered descendible upon death.
50. See e.g. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 134. "Damage is commercial injury
to the business value of personal identity." Id.
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relatives.'
Consequently, jurisdictions that do recognize a
descendible publicity right have done so by acknowledging this
right as a type of intangible proprietary interest. 2 Whereas, courts
that have held that the right of publicity dies with the person have
often entangled privacy and publicity rights. 3
To return to the Introduction of this paper, recall my use of Elvis
Presley in hypothetical examples that both potentially soiled his
reputation and infringed upon his right of publicity. The reason
why I chose Elvis was not just because I was a fan; nor did I
merely pull his name from a hat filled with the names of other
dead celebrities. Rather, I used him because he is one of the most
prolific figures when it comes to publicity rights of the dead. As I
had noted above, there is an entire body of Elvis law, most of
which concern descendible publicity rights." Thus, it is not
surprising that Tennessee is just one of thirteen states that
statutorily recognizes the right of publicity both in life and death."
Of all the cases comprising Elvis jurisprudence, one decision that
is cited as often as any is State ex. rel. Elvis Presley International
v. Crowell. 6 In this case a group of Elvis fans, collectively calling
themselves the Elvis Presley International Memorial Fund, sought
a charter as a Tennessee not-for-profit organization in support of
the Memphis and Shelby County hospital system. 7 The Secretary
of State denied the application on the grounds that Elvis's name

51. See J. Graham Matheme, Descendibility of PublicityRights in Tennessee,
53 TENN. L. REV. 753, 754 (1986); Gary M. Ropski, Celebrity Status and Right
ofPublicity,New York L. Joum., Jan. 31, 1997, at 5.
52. See e.g. State ex. rel Elvis Presley Int'l v. Crowell, 773 S.W. 2d 89
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). See notes 56-60 and accompanying text infra.
53. See e.g. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
See notes 75-78 and accompanying text infra.
54. See fa. 4, supra (string-citing a list of pertinent Elvis cases).
55. The Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-251103(b) (providing in part that the right of publicity "shall be freely assignable
and licensable, and shall not expire upon the death of the individual so
protected.. ."); see also, McCarthy, supra note 6, at 132.
56. 733 S.W. 2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
57. See id. at 92.
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could not be used in the charter."8 The court held that under
Tennessee common law 9 Elvis did, in fact, have a descendible
right to his name and persona." What is puzzling about this case
is that the court made no mention as to the possible consequences
of allowing a not-for-profit organization to use the name or
likeness of celebrity. As discussed above, the primary basis in
support of publicity rights is preventing others from commercially
benefiting through exploitation of a celebrity's hard earned
identity.61 What commercial benefit is a not-for-profit organizing
62
looking to gain?
Even with the ruling in Elvis Presley International,"The King"
should not rest too comfortably in his Graceland tomb. A dead
Elvis is not necessarily alive and well; at least that is what the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc. Inc.63 In this
leading case, the court defied prior Tennessee state law and held
that upon death "the opportunity for gain shifted from the celebrity
to the public domain."'6 Thus, until the passage of the Tennessee
Personal Rights Act of 1984,65 the federal law and state law
governing descendible publicity rights in Tennessee were in
conflict with one another.6
58. See id.
59. The court did recognize that Tennessee passed a statute codifying
descendible publicity rights. However, at the time this litigation commenced
such statue was but a twinkle in a congressman's eye. Hence, the common law
analysis. See id. 99.
60. See id. at 100 (remanded on other grounds).
61. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
62. I am inclined to call this notion the "appropriation versus dedication"
problem and will discuss it more closely in Section IV of this paper.
63. 616 F. 2d 956 (6"h Cir. 1980). The facts of this case concern the creation
of pewter Elvis statutes for resale.
64. See id. at 959.
65. See fn. 55 supra.
66. See Elvis Presley Int'l, 733 S.W. 2d at 95-96.
It should be noted that the Federal Circuits, in deciding to apply state law, also
lack consistency. See e.g. Factors Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2 nd
Cir. 1978) (holding that the Elvis persona was descendible under New York
common law and thus an unauthorized memorial poster of him was an
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Descendible publicity rights are not all just "hound dogs"
and "heartbreak hotels," however. An often-cited, non-Elvis case
in support of such rights is Martin Luther King Jr. Center for
67
Social Change, Inc., v. American Heritage Products.
In this
case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the right of publicity
was descendible and thus to create a bust of Dr. King, Jr. for retail
purposes without the authorization of his estate would, therein, be
a violation of that right.68 What is more interesting about this case,
however, is that the court further ruled that publicity rights were
descendible irrespective of whether the public figure exploited
their image for commercial advantage during their lifetime. 9 The
defendant argued that even though publicity rights were
descendible, the fact that Dr. King, Jr. did not use his name or
likeness for commercial profit while alive precluded his estate
from doing so in death.7" The court dismissed this, stating that Dr.
King, Jr. could have exploited his identity during his lifetime, and
although he chose not to, this does not "strip his family and estate
the right to control... his status and memory and to prevent
unauthorized exploitation thereof by others."7 This conclusion is
distinguishable from other cases that have ruled in favor of
descendible publicity rights. For example, one such case held that
the right of publicity, "having been exercised during the
individual's life and thus having attained a concrete form, should
descend at death of the individual..." 72
infringement of the right of publicity).
67. 296 S.E. 2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
68. See id. at 705. Interestingly, Dr. King, Jr.'s estate pursued this suit even
though the defendant testified that he was planning to give it a portion of the
proceeds derived from the busts. See id. at 698.
69. See id. at 706.
70. See id. at 705-06.
71. See id. at 706. Another case that entertained this notion, albeit in dicta is
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). "It cannot be
possible for Laurel and Hardy to lose rights in their own names and likenesses
through 'non-use' ... There cannot, therefore, be any necessity to exercise the
right of publicity during one's life in order to protect it from use by others or to
preserve any potential right to one's heirs." Id. at 846.
72. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981)
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As stated above, courts that preclude descendibility tend to do so
by separating the right of publicity from the right to privacy with a
short rope; certainly shorter than what Nimmer and his champions
had in mind. Ohio is one such jurisdiction.73 On as many as three
occasions, The Buckeye State has rejected the notion of
descendible publicity rights.74 One example is a case often
referred to as The Raging Bull Case.75 In this case the wife of the
late boxer Jimmy Reeves sued the defendant for violation of her
husband's publicity rights in the dramatization of his fight with
Jake LaMotta in the film "Raging Bull. '76 The court did observe
that a majority of jurisdictions had previously granted devisable
publicity rights. 7 But nonetheless, it held that the right "was more
closely aligned with the right of privacy" than a property interest,
and as such, it ceased at death.78
With Ohio's track record why did Reeves's widow file her claim
in that jurisdiction? Why not file in California, the defendant's
domicile, instead? If she had initiated the suit in California,
however, the ultimate determination might not have changed. For,
in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, the California Supreme Court
similarly held that the right to one's persona was a privacy interest
and thus terminated upon death.79 In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim
(emphasis added) (concerning an apparently rather talented Elvis impersonator).
For further discussion on similar cases, see Matheme, supra note 51, at 763-66.
73. See Matherne, supra note 51, at fn. 62.
74. See id.
75. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (upheld
on appeal, 765 F. 2d 79 (6'"Cir. 1985).
Other Ohio cases include: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 351 N.E.
2d 454 (Ohio 1976) (overturned on appeal by the United States Supreme Court,
see fn. , supra); Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (ruling that the rights of privacy and publicity more akin than
not and thus non-devisable).
76. See id. at 1232.
77. See id. at 1233-34.
78. See id. at 1235.
79. 603 P. 2d 425, 431 (Ca. 1979). It should be noted that the state of
California subsequently enacted legislation that in effect overruled the holding
in Lugosi by expressly providing for devisable publicity rights. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3344.1 (as amended by 1999 CAL. STAT. CH. 998). However, this happened
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that the Bela Lugosi Dracula character was an interest passed on to
surviving relatives, the court stated that "[t]he very decision to
exploit name and likeness is a personal one."8 The court further
held that since relatives do not hold a property interest in a
celebrity's persona during their lifetime, it should follow that they
do not receive such upon death, either." Thus, at least for this
California Supreme Court, Dracula whose very character embodies
the promise of everlasting life is, in a legal sense, dead.
Ill. DEAD MEN HEAR No TALES? DEFAMATION OF THE DEAD

Defamation is an umbrella term under which exist the torts of
libel and slander. False statements in writing or some other
permanent state that tend to discredit a person are libel.82 Whereas
disparagements
"in some fugitive form," i.e. spoken or
gesticulated, are considered to be slander.83 There had been
numerous formulae defining defamation,84 however at common
law, it was typically recognized as stigmatizations holding a
person up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.8" Historically, the
claimant in a defamation action recovered monetary damages
without being required to show any actual economic loss.8" Thus,
actual damages were assumed.8

after the Reeves suit commenced. Thus, Lugosi would have been the ruling law.
80. See Lugosi, 603 P. 2d at 430.
81. See id.
82. See Roland Brown and Richard O'Sullivan, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 5
(1958)
83. See id. For purposes of this paper, "defamation" and "hbel" will be used
synonymously.
84. For a further discussion on the various common law definitions, see id. at
3-7.
85. See Clarence Morris and C. Robert Morris, Jr., Momus ON TORTS 329
(2 nd ed. 1980).

86. See id. at 332. This has since changed after New York Times v. Sullivan.
376 U.S. 254 (1967). See notes 94-101 and accompanying text infra.
87. Perhaps William Shakespeare expressed this convention the best when he
wrote:
"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
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With these governances of defamation law, it is important to
reserve brief attention to the law as it applies to the living before
discussing its application toward the deceased.
A.

Defamation of the Living

Defamation of a living person is considered a cause of action, as
it invades a person's "interest in reputation and good name."88
This interest is at the crux of a defamation tort.89 Consequently,
such an issue arises only when something disparaging to one's
reputation is imparted to a third person.9" This is irrespective of
the defamed's own subjective feelings of slight and insult.9" Thus,
at common law, the following elements must be met in order to
prove defamation: (1) the statement must be "published" to a third
party; (2) it must be false; (3) it must be defamatory, i.e.
considered injurious to one's reputation and standing in the
community; (4) it must be "of and concerning" the person seeking
legal recourse; and (5) the alleged defamer must have acted with a
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse, steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed." Othello, Act III, Scene 3, line 167-73.
88. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 111 at 771 (1984); see also Lisa
Brown, Dead but Not Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for
Defamationfor the Dead, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1525, 1529-30 (1989).
89. See generally Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American
Society, 74 CAL. L. REv. 743 (1986).
90. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 111 at 771;
The relationship between the defamed, the defendant, and those privy to the
marring statement is often referred to as the "defamation triangle." See Brown,
supra note 88, at 1529, Fn 20 (citing Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan
Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 782, 785 (1986)).
91. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 111 at 771.
Here the authors note that "[d]erogatory words and insults directed to the
plaintiff himself may afford an action for the intentional infliction of mental
suffering, but unless they are communicated to another the action cannot be one
for defamation, no matter how harrowing they may be to the feelings." See id.
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particular level of culpability.12 At common law, this level of
culpability differed among jurisdictions and was usually divided
between strict liability and negligence.93
In the landmark decision New York Times v. Sullivan, the United
States Supreme Court entered the defamation fray, and therein
consitutionalized the cause of the action.94 Specifically, the
decision addressed the element of defendant culpability, which as
noted above, was fraught with inconsistency at common law."
The case concerned an advertisement that ran in the New York
Times implicating the plaintiff, one of the elected Commissioners
of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, as having persecuted those
92. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 111 at 773-80;
The Second Restatement of Torts similarly provides the elements of a
defamation cause of action as such:
"(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
exisitence of special harm caused by the publication." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS, § 558.
For further consideration of each of the common law elements: see Brown and
O'Sullivan, supra note 82, at 36 (stating "[a]ny act on the part of the defendant
which makes known the defamatory matter to a third person amounts to
publication); R. Epstein, TORTS (5k" ed. 1990) (stating that truth is an absolute
defense to a defamation claim and thus "tantamount to an assertion that a
statement is defamatory only if it is false"); Cardiff v. Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 75

N.Y.S. 2d 222 (1947) (holding that a published obituary of an living person is
not defamatory as it did not expose the plaintiff to "hatred, ridicule, or
contempt); Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 50 T.L.R. 581
(C.A. 1934) (discussing whether a film depicting a Russian princess having an
intimate relationship with Rasputin, a real-life figure of repute, was indeed "of
and concerning" plaintiff Princess Irina Alexandrovna).
93. See e.g. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 558(c) (providing "faulth
amounting at least to negligence"); but see Tate v. Bradley, 837 F. 2d 206 (5t1
Cir. 1988) (stating that "[a]ctual malice... is presumed and need not be proved
if the words are defamatory on their face").
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
95. For example, the trial judge's charge to the jury in the proceeding below
provided that a finding of defamation is libel per se, aloof of the plaintiff's
actual intent or negligent behavior. See id. at 262.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

17

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XII:297

participating in certain lawful demonstrations during the Civil
Rights Movement.96 The Court concluded that the statements were
commentary of a public official acting within his authorized
capacity, and that, irrespective of veracity, such commentary is not
"libelous per se."97 Further, the Court provided that the First
Amendment afforded a measure of "breathing space" for criticism
of officials and their public conduct, and thus held that such
statements are considered defamatory only if there is a showing of
actual malice on behalf of the defendant. 8 In doing so, the Court
established a constitutional mechanism through which a
defamation claim must be processed; with its cogs and gears
pausing for determinations of plaintiff status and defendant
culpability.99
Sullivan provided the impetus for the Court to establish its
defamation doctrine."°° By solely addressing the issue of officials
and their public conduct, it left matters concerning public figures,
private affairs, and private individuals on the table and vulnerable
to misinterpretation.'
The next cases in this line extended the
96. See id. at 257-59. It should be noted that the plaintiff in Sullivan was
never named, but rather he argued that the advertisement reflected on him and
was, thus, "of and concerning" him.
97. See id. at 279.
98. See id. at 279-80.
99. Justice Brennan, in writing for the majority, ruled:
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering from damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." See id. at 279-80 (internal quotations

omitted).
100. See generally, Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan
Reconsidered. Time to Return to "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1983). The author noted that the
Supreme Court had gone 170 years without fixing a First Amendment analysis
to libel causes of action. See id. at 604.
101. Shortly after the Sullivan decision, Professor Harvey Kalven
commented that the case's holding invited a "dialectic progression from public
official to government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain."
Harvey Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning
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Sullivan holding to criminal libel statues and then to public figures
who were not considered public officials."' The direction the
Court was taking after Sullivan seemed to place more emphasis on
the public interest in the subject of the defamatory publication than
the "public" status of the plaintiff. 3 However, this movement
toward public concern was pared in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., as
the Court returned its focus to the plaintiffs status.'
Here, the
Court held that defamation of a private individual should receive a
lesser degree of constitutional protection regardless if the subject
of the publication was a matter of public concern.' 5 Thus, the
First Amendment tableau by which a defamation matter must be
set against should be recognized as such:
If it is a Public Official and a matter of Public Concern, then
Actual Malice;'5
If a Public Figure coupled with a Public Concern, then Actual
Malice;' 7
If a Private Individual coupled with a Public Concern, then a
lesser Negligence standard." 8
of the FirstAmendment", 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191; see also Lewis, supra note
100, at 608.
102. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 389 U.S. 889 (1967); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 376 U.S. 64 (1964).
103. See Lewis, supra note 100, at 623.
104. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
105. See id. Gertz in fact rejected a previous plurality decision that held that
actual malice standard applied to any plaintiff so long as the subject of
publication was a public concern. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29
(1971).
106. The ruling in Sullivan has been extended to suggest that "anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for office" is a public concern
regardless of whether or not the person was acting within his/her official
capacity. See Garrison, 376 U.S. at 77.
107. There are generally two types of public figures: All-purpose within all
contents, i.e. a celebrity such as Madonna, and limited-purpose, or "vortex"
public figures who either voluntarily inject themselves or are drawn into a
temporary public issue, i.e. the Atlanta Olympics' security guard Richard Jewel.
See generally, Time, Inc v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz, 418 U.S. at
323.
108. Presently, the Court has not yet conveyed a standard with respect to
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Despite the Supreme Court's insertion into the defamation
arena, some scholars have pointed out that the once common lawexclusive cause of action has not entirely succumbed to a freedom
of speech application." 9 That is, an interest in protecting one's
reputation in the community remains a legitimate concern for a
state to pursue, notwithstanding the constitutional weight now
given to both the defendant's state of mind and the publicity of the
subject matter. This longstanding interest in reputation is
important when considered within the context of defaming the
dead.
B. Defamation of the Dead
It should be maintained with little argument that a person may
continue to live in memoriam long after their death and thus be in
the position to have their eternal character soiled by postmortem
defamatory statements. However, civil courts have consistently
rejected causes of action for defamation of the dead."0 This is not
so in a criminal context where several states continue to have
statutes criminalizing statements designed to "blacken" or vilify
the memory of one who is dead."' This incongruence between
civil and criminal law seems to hinge on the notion of injury. That
is, one who is deceased retains some form of reputation and
attempts to mar that reputation should be discourdged. Yet this
defamation of private individuals within private matters. The Court did hint,
however, that First Amendment protection is ratcheted down when it allowed
recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice
for a private individual/private interest defamation case. See Dun & Bradstreet
v. Greenmoss Builders.
109. See e.g. Brown, supra note 88, at 1530 (stating that even though
"modem defamation litigation has emphasized state of mind issues, protection
of reputation is still the thrust of a defamation suit").
110. See generallyWittenberg, supra note 3, at 202-08.
111. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 18-13-105 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. 16-2240 (2000); IDAHO CODE 18-4801 (2000); NEV. STAT. ANN. 200.510 (Michie
2000); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-15.01 (2000); 12 OKLA. ST. 1441 (2000); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & CODE ANN. 73.001 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. 45-2-2
(1998).
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protection should not be so extensive as to include monetary
awards to the deceased's estate or surviving relatives. Such an
award to the descendents would seem unjust, since it was not their
reputation that was made the subject of hatred, ridicule, or
contempt; in other words, the defamation was not "of and
concerning" them.
1.

"Of and Concerning": The No Civil Remedy Rationale

Generally, arguments given in support of a defamation suit
initiated by one's estate or surviving relatives echoed the Roman
law of libel, which held, inter alia, "contemptuous demeanor
toward a corpse to be an insult to the heir for which an action
would lie.""'
However, in rejecting these causes of action,
common law courts, both pre- and post-Sullivan, have primarily
relied on the rationale that the alleged defamatory statements must
concern the plaintiff."
This rationale is further evident in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, as it provides: "One who publishes
defamatory matter concerning a deceased person is not liable
either to the estate of the person or to his descendents or
relatives."". a Thus a defamation suit brought on behalf of a
deceased person would likely falter, as the statements would not

112. See Walter P. Armstrong, Nothing but Good of the Dead?, 18 A.B.A. J.

229, 230 (1932).
Some civil law jurisdictions also provide a cause of action for defamation of the
dead. See Decisions, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 1267 (1940 ) (noting that France,
Germany and Quebec provide such remedies for descendents); but see Raymond
Iryami, Give the Dead their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause ofAction
for Defamation of the Deadfrom CriminalLibel Statutes, 9 FORD. I.P. MEDIA &

ENT. L.J. 1083, 1088-89 (1999) (noting that Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction,
has adopted the common law standard).
113. See e.g. Lambert v. Garlo, 484 n.E. 2d 260 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)0; Lee
v. Weston, 402 N.E. 2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Gonzales v. Times Herald
Printing Co., 513 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Hughes v. New England
Newspaper Pub. Co., 43 N.E. 2d 657 (Mass. 1942).

114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 560. "The interest of the
descendents or other relatives of the deceased person in his good name is not
given legal protection by the common law." See id. at cmt. a.
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have discredited the plaintiff s character."1 5
To suggest that the common law rule precludes all libel actions
that might arise out an instance of such defamation is overzealous.
A plaintiff is refused relief when he or she sues on behalf of the
deceased." 6 This is different than a scenario in which a
defamatory remark concerning the dead also contains a direct
attack on the good name of someone who is alive." 7
Appropriately, cases arising out of defamatory statements made
against the dead have been divided into three categories: (1) the
defamation is solely directed toward the deceased; (2) the
defamation indirectly affects the good name of someone living;
and (3) the defamation of one who is dead contains an affront
against the reputation of one who is living, as well. 8
As discussed above, common law courts have long held that
there is no cause of action for cases that fall within the first
category." 9 Further, courts have generally extended this standard
to those cases classified within the second category, as well. 2 ° A
widely cited example of such a case is the Baldy Jack Rose
decision.12' In his time "Baldy" Jack Rose was an infamous "selfconfessed" murderer in New York.122 A Jack Rose different from
115. See e.g. Benton v. Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 130 S.W. 2d 106
(1939); Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 79 N.W. 122 (1899) (holding that a mother
may not sue on behalf of her deceased son, as the statement that he was a
counterfeiter did not concern her).
116. See Whittenberg, supra note, at 203.
117. See id.
118. Seeid.
119. See notes 113-115 and accompanying text supra.
120. See e.g. Wellman v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 21 N.Y. Supp. 577
(1892) (holding that despite injury to his professional character a husband could
not sue for damages arising out of defamatory remarks made against his dead
wife).
It should be noted that Wellman represented the first American decision made
with respect to this classification, "and its authority has been buttressed by a
large number of cases which have followed its conclusion." Recent Decisions,
10 FORDHAM. L. REV. 319, 320 (1941).
121. Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 31 N.E. 2d 183 (1940).
122. See Wittenberg, supra note 3, at 205. The author made further
reference that "Baldy" was involved in the murder of the gambler Arnold
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"Baldy" had died and a New York paper published an article
attributing "Baldy's" notorious life to his."
The article also
named his surviving wife and children who, in turn, initiated
litigation arguing that the erroneous identification of their Jack
Rose as "Baldy" Jack Rose and the further mention of their names
constituted an indignity upon their reputation and good name
within the community." In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention, the
Court of Appeals for the State of New York held that "it has been
long accepted law that a libel or slander upon the memory of a
deceased person which makes no direct reflection upon his
relatives gives them no cause of action for defamation."'"
Although the Baldy Jack Rose decision does reflect the
contemporary, majority standard, there are cases in which
surviving relatives who are named in the defamatory publication
have been able to sustain a defamation cause of action. One such
case is Van Wiginton v. PulitzerPub. Co., wherein the court ruled
that a claim may be pursued if the plaintiff is specifically featured
in the article and his or her relationship with the deceased is
prominent.

126

If both the living and the deceased are defamed within the same
stride, then the instance falls within the third category, wherein the
living plaintiff is typically granted legal recourse.'
Thus if a
Rothstein, which gave rise to the "famous Lieutenant Becker Case." See id.
123. See Rose, 31 N.E. 2dat 182.

124. See id.
125. See id. (Emphasis added). For further discussion on the Baldy Jack

Rose Case and appropriate analogous cases at the time of its decision, see
Wittberg, supra note , at 205; Recent Decisions 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 321
(1941); Notes and Comments, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 732 (1940); Decisions, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 1267 (1940).
126. 218 Fed. 795 (8th Cir. 1914) (concerning a girl who was mentioned in an
article that erroneously stated that her deceased father was convicted of
murdering her mother).
Another similar case held that plaintiff merely had to be named in the
publication. See Merrill v. Post Pub. Co., 83 N.E. 419 (1908) (concerning a
postmaster who was named in article that erroneously depicted his sister as
having stolen mail from his post office).
127. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 111 at 778-79 (stating that "no
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magazine article incorrectly portrayed a plaintiff and her deceased
husband as being a "modem-day Bonnie and Clyde," she should
be able to initiate litigation on her behalf, as the publication
directly injured her reputation.'28 Arrival at this. standard should be
achieved with little difficulty, as such a situation merely resembles
the everyday brand of defamation. The distinction simply arises
out of the fact that the defamation is accompanied in29 a publication
by an additional disparagement of one who is dead. 1
Because the "of and concerning" element is fundamental to a
defamation cause of action, libeling the dead is virtually
unrecognized by common law courts.'30 Consequently, reputation
is recognized as a personal right.'
And although reputation is
often regarded as everlasting,3 2 the common law has long
dismissed the right to "reflect in the reputation of another."'33
civil action will lie for the defamation of one who is dead, unless there is a
reflection upon those still living, who are themselves defamed").
128. C.f Eagles v. Liberty Weekly, 244 N.Y.S. 430 (1930) (rejecting an
injunction claim against the publication of a magazine article as it did not
directly libel the plaintiffs).
129. See generally, Wittenberg, supra note 3, at 205-06.
A similar periphery issue involves instances when a living person has been
mistakenly reported as being dead. In such matters, courts have typically held
the defendant liable for defamation. See e.g. Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 N.Y. App.
Div. 636 (concerning an article, which stated that President Roosevelt's son-inlaw had committed suicide as an attention-getting device for the real story of the
suicide of the French Prime Minister's son-in-law); see also Iryami, supra note
112, at 1093; Wittenberg, supra note 3, at 206-08; but see Cardiff v. Brooklyn
Eagle, Inc., 75 N.Y.S. 2d 222 (1947) (holding that a published obituary of an
living person is not defamatory as it did not expose the plaintiff to "hatred,
ridicule, or contempt").
130. See generally Brown, supra note 88, at 1530-34.
131. Seeid.at1531.
132. See Section III-B-2, infra.
133. See Brown, supra note 88, at 1532 (quoting Gruschus v. Curtis Pub.
Co., 342 F. 2d 775, 776 (10' cir. 1965)).
However, the notion that reputation is a personal right is not universally
accepted. Professor Bellah argued that "reputation is something shared and
reflected. Something that in the reputation of a parent, child, spouse, or friend
reflects to some degree on us." See Bellah, supra note 99, at 745.
Perhaps, it is with this idea of reputation that criminal statutes outlawing
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Thus surviving relatives are restricted from bringing defamation
suits on behalf of their deceased kin in the same manner as would
3
be if a person attempted to recover from an assault of another. 1
As one British scholar stated, "[ilibel deals with the settling of
personal accounts between the living."' 35 To put it another way,
the law, in requiring that the defamatory statement be "of and
concerning" the plaintiff, has excluded the deceased (more so, the
deceased's reputation) from litigation.'36 It would be improper,
though, to suggest that all defamatory statements concerning the
dead fail, in a legal sense, to reach an audible ear. Certainly, other
avenues for redress remain. For example, some scholars have
strenuously argued for claims of infliction of emotional distress as
alternatives to defamation actions. "'
defamation of the dead were enacted. See Section Lll-B-2, infra.
134. See Brown, supra note 88, at 1533.
135. See Joseph Dean, HATRED, RIDICULE OR CONTEMPT 96 (1954).
136. At this point, it should be noted that Rhode Island is the only
jurisdiction that provides a cause of action for defamation of the dead.
However, the defamation must be published as a part of an obituary or a similar
notice within three months of death. Additionally, the statute requires a oneyear statute of limitation for the possible plaintiffs. See R.I. GEN. LAws 10-7.11 (2000); see also Iryami, supra note 112, at 1092.
By devising such a statute, it can be argued that Rhode Island was attempting to
prevent a similar situation that occurred in Louisiana in which a news broadcast
erroneously reported that the plaintiffs deceased son was involved in a murder,
therein causing the family to suffer "general abuse, ridicule [and] a refusal to
take up collections for the funeral." See Coulon v. Gaylord, 433 So. 2d 429,
430 (La. Ct. App. 1983); see also Brown, supra note 88, at 1533-34.
137. See e.g. Brown, supra note 88, at 1542-57.
Another interesting manner in which a surviving son sought vindication against
defamatory statements published concerning his deceased father occurred in the
English case, Wright v. Gladstone (1927). Captain Peter Wright published a
book of essays, one of which included the unfavorable portrayal of the former
Prime Minister Gladstone. One of the former Prime Minister's sons then wrote
to the secretary of a club of which both he and Wright belonged. In the letter,
the son called Wright a "liar and a coward" for defaming a dead man and thus
giving no cause for remedy. Wright then sued the son for libel wherein
litigation commenced. It was during the course of the very public trial that the
son was able to cleanse his father's good name from its soiling made previous
by Wright's prose. Thus, by publicly insulting Wright, the younger Gladstone
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Notwithstanding the notion that the "of and concerning" element
is primarily responsible for negating defamation causes of action
with respect to the dead, some scholars have urged that to allow
defamation suits on behalf of the deceased would have a chilling
One
effect on biographies and other historical writings.'38
recognized argument suggests that historians, in doing a great
public service, are usually unable to collect eyewitness information
or interview their subjects, and thus need the freedom to report and
comment on information accordingly.'39 If this were so, however,
what does this say about defamation laws that protect the living?
It can be argued that such laws can also have a similar "chilling
effect" on writers and social critics who report and document the
living world. 4 Further, this "chilling effect" rationale does not
address the reasons why criminal statutes prohibiting defamation
of the dead continue to exist.
2.

EverlastingRep.: The Rationale of CriminalDefamation

In upholding criminal statutes that outlaw defamation of the
dead, courts have acknowledged that the public interest in the
memory of the dead is a legitimate state concern. 14' A typical
criminal statute for defamation of the deceased is like that of
Colorado's, which provides:
".... [One who] knowingly publish or disseminate, either by
written instrument, sign, picture, or the like, any statement or
object tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead...
adopted a "circuitous approach" to litigation. Certainly, he did not receive
monetary damages, but he was able to restore the reputation of one who is
deceased. Because the Gladstone case was not appealed, it was not reported.
For an in-depth discussion of the case, see Dean, supra note 135, at 96-117;
Armstong, supra note 112, at 229-32.
138. See Brown, supra note 88, at 1538-42; see generally Lois G. Forer, A
CHILLING EFFECT 208-234 (asking the question: "Is there a right to
biography?").
139. See Brown, supranote 88, at 1541.
140. See id.
141. See Prosser and Keaton, supra note 12, § 111 at 778-79.
142. COLO. REV. STAT. 18-13-105 (2000).
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Although rooted in the common law tradition, these statutes tend
to be more encompassing than their English counterparts, which
often required "actual malevolent intention" and "the tendency to
cause a breach of peace." ' 43 Without such English elements,
American criminal statues thus shift the state's enforcement
interest from preserving the well-being and peace of the
community to protecting the reputation of the departed."' This
was captured by one court as it stated: "[A]s a matter of sound
public policy, the malicious defamation of the memory of the dead
is condumen as an affront to the general sentiments of morality
and decency, and the interests of society demand its punishment
through criminal courts."' 45 Whether a criminal libel statute that
includes the deceased within its purview is served to protect the
community from breaches of order or designed as a safeguard
against attacks hostile to a reputation that cannot be rightly
defended, both fixate themselves on the tarnishing, or
"blackening," of a dead person's character.'46
A comparison can be drawn between the interest in protecting
the good name of one who is dead and the standard applied to a
matter involving the defamation of a private individual.'47 A
private person suing for defamation only has to provide that the
defendant acted with negligence, and not with ill-will or reckless

143. See Armstrong, supra note 112, at 230.
144. See generally, id. at 229-232 (reviewing three cases at the time
involving a defamation of the dead in France, England and the United States,
respectively); but see Iryami, supra note 112, at 1103-05. Here, the author
noted that the breach of peace requirement was not strict. It was not necessary
to show actual breach of peace. Rather, "the defendant could be found guilty of
criminal libel, if the natural effect of the published words would vilify the
memory of the deceased making a breach of peace imminent or probable." Id.

(Internal quotations omitted).
145. Skrocki v. Stahl, 110 P. 957, 960 (Cal. App. 3d 1910) (holding that the

decedent's brother did not have a cause action against statements made
depicting the deceased as an anarchist).
146. See Iryami, supra note 112, at 1108 (noting that such a difference

between the two rationales behind a criminal libel statue is a "Minor" one).
147. See Gertz 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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disregard of the truth.'48 The thought behind this is that a private
person does not have convenient access to media outlets and
therefore is unable to easily defend his/her name in the public
forum. 49 This inability to rightly defend one's name is evident in
a matter of those deceased. Irrespective of whether the deceased
was a celebrity or a private individual, he or she does not have the
ability to defend their reputation-which the state has deemed
everlasting-from beyond the grave. Thus, to criminalize attacks
upon the good memory of the dead serves both to deter such
affronts and further protect the otherwise un-defendable good
name of those who are deceased.
Mention should be made that, despite its proliferation in as
many as twenty-one jurisdictions, criminal libel prosecutions are
presently in a state of decline. 5 ' Perhaps one reason for this is the
In
Supreme Court's decision in Garrison v. Louisiana.'
Garrison, the Court held that the Louisiana criminal defamation
statute, which even prohibited true statements made with "actual
malice," to be unconstitutional as it abridged the right to free
expression.'52 In doing so, the Court extended the Sullivan
standard (false statements made with actual malice or reckless
disregard for the truth) from civil to criminal defamation.'53
Following Garrison the constitutionality of such statutes have
been questioned. 4 For example in Colorado and South Carolina,
a state and federal court, respectively, invalidated both of the
states' criminal libel statutes, as they did not contain an "actual
malice" standard."' Also, the Model Penal Code contains no
enumerations for criminal libel.5 6 Its drafters assumed that there

148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See Iryami, supra note 112, at 1108-12.
151. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
152. See id. at 77-78.
153. See id. at 78-79.
154. See Iryami, supra note 112, at 1109-11.
155. See Colorado v. Ryan, 806 P. 2d 935 (Col. 1991); Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F.
Supp. 1502 (D. S.C. 1991).
156. See Iryami, supra note 112, at 1109-11.
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was enough of a remedy for such an action provided at the civil
level and thus to criminally punish was unnecessary." 7 These
examples, however, concern criminal libel in general and do not
specifically speak to the issue of defamation of the dead; though it
should logically follow that if criminal libel prosecutions in
general are diminishing, then such matters concerning defamation
of the dead are becoming extinct, as well.
IV. PUTTING BOTH FEET IN THE GRAVE: TOWARD A UNIFORM
TREATMENT OF THE DEAD

As provided above, the dead in certain scenarios are afforded the
same legal rights as though they were alive, while other times,
their ability to initiate litigation is rendered, well.. .dead. With
this, the question is posed: Why have a system that handles
different legal matters of the dead inconsistently?
However, before attention can be given to the arguments
advancing a uniform treatment of the dead, it is important to
quickly address the practicality of two other legal matters
concerning the deceased.
That is, wrongful death and
survivability.
A.

Wrongful Death and Survivability

Actio personalis moritur cum persona. In translation this Latin
maxim means "a personal right of action dies with the person."' 58
The common law recognized this doctrine, providing specifically
that if the tort victim died, so did his cause of action.59 It followed
that if the tortfeasor died, the claim also died. 6 ' Finally, the
common law held that if the victim died, the survivors had no
personal claim for loss of support or infliction of emotional
157. See Model Penal Code 250.7 cmt. 1; see also hyami, supra note 112, at
1111.
158. Florence Frances Cameron, Defamation and the Demise of the
Antiquated "Actio Personails"Doctrine,85 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, fn. 3 (1985).
159. See Dan B. Dobbs THE LAW OF TORTs 803 (2000).
160. See id.
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distress. 6 ' In the late nineteenth century, however, American
jurisdictions rejected this common law rule and began adopting
state legislation providing wrongful death and survivability
actions. 6 2 The two actions are distinguishable as such:
Wrongful death laws create an entirely new and independent
claim, in which survivors of a tort victim are able to sue for
damages inflicted as a result of the victim's death.'63 Survival
statutes, on the other hand, "address the common law rule that a
tort cause of action abated with the death of either party."'" That
is, the deceased's cause of action is allowed to "survive" past
death with the potential damages he would have received "if he
had been able to sue at the moment of death."' 65 Survivability of
an action may even occur if the tortfeasor dies before the
termination of a claim.'66
Wrongful death actions spring into effect at the time of death
and are not descended to the survivors like a publicity right would.
Because such statutes create a new cause of action for survivors
while focusing on their loss, the dead are given a supporting role.
With this, death actions are not that pertinent for purposes of this
paper. Survival laws, however, do relate a little more closely to
publicity rights. That is, the ability to advance a claim on behalf of
a deceased relative is akin to a person claiming a descendible right
of publicity on a deceased relative's name or likeness. Also, at
one point, both common law courts and some survival statues have
expressly disallowed the survival of defamation actions while the
defamation was made before death.'67 However, present trend
suggests that more jurisdictions are allowing the survival of
defamation claims.'68
161. See id.
162. Seeid.
163. See id. at 804. It should be noted that the defendant's tortious behavior

causally lead to the victim's death.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id.
See id. at 805. The cause of death is immaterial to a survival statute.
See id. at 807.
See id. at 1140.
See generally Cameron, supra note 158, at. 1834-39 (chronicling this
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One last thought on this subject before moving on: The theme of
this paper is to recognize instances in which the dead are called
from their graves to basically participate as a party in an matter
that arose out of an action that occurred after death. Because
wrongful death actions create a new claim for the living and
survival statutes provide either a mere continuation of a claim
between two living people that was interrupted by the death of one
or a commencement of a claim that arose out of a tort between two
living people, where one of whom happened to die, they are
periphery matters to the overall theme of this paper.
B.

The Living Dead or Rest in Peace?

Acknowledging the need for a uniform treatment of the dead is
just half of the task. The other is deciding which avenue to take.
Should the dead be given free reign of the country's judicial
system, much like its living citizens? Or should they, with all their
potential legal concerns, be forever entombed?
In order to allow the dead to haunt courtrooms to the fullest of
their capabilities, it is necessary to acknowledge defamation suits
when publication occurred after death. Arguments for creating a
cause of action for defamation of the dead center on the notion of
reputation.'69 Specifically, a person's reputation, although personal
and thus non-transferable, still maintains both a societal interest
and a familial interest after death.17 Thus, the argument would
follow: Because there is more than just the personal interest of the
deceased at stake, those other living interests whose lives are
affected by the defamatory statement should not be precluded from
a cause of action. However, this is not sturdy reasoning. Living
people whose interests have been affected by a defamatory remark
trend).
169. See generally Brown, supra note 88; Iryami, supra note 112.
170. See Brown, supra note 8, at 1528 (stating that defamatory statements
can effect feeling's of the decedent's family, as well as economic interests in the
decedent's estate or family business); Iryami, supranote 112,at 1102-03 (stating
that criminal libel statutes are devised to preserve society's interest in good
order).
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against one who is dead do have potential legal redress, just not in
the form of a defamation action.'71 For instance one might claim
that the defamation of a deceased relative inflicted emotional
72
distress.
Another course to take in support of defamation of the dead
would be to illustrate the Supreme Court's language in Swidler &
Berlin v. Untied States'73 and contend that reputation is not a
personal right; that it is similar to the right of publicity and
therefore descendible upon death. In Swidler, the Court held that
lawyers may not release communications with a client and thus
abridge the attorney-client privilege, even after the client's
death.'
What sharpened this point to the issue of defamation of
the dead, however, was Chief Justice William Rehnquist's
conclusion on reputation. In writing for the majority, he stated that
it is unreasonable to suggest that a person's interest in his
reputation terminated at his death. 7 ' To take the Chief Justice's
statement and construe it to mean that reputation, by being able to
exist after death, is like persona and therefore descendible upon
death, would be an enormous leap. Further, to suggest that the
Chief Justice had defamation and publicity rights in mind when
writing that portion of the opinion is pure conjecture. Nonetheless,
with Swidler a seed has been planted. There is no telling how high
and how far it may grow. 7
Certainly, if defamation of the dead does become a cause of
171. That is, unless they themselves were also defamed in the publication.
See fni. 127-129 and accompanying text supra.

172. See Brown, supra note 88, at 1546-52.
173. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
174. See id. This case arose out of the Independent Counsel's investigation
of the dismissal of the White House Travel Office employees and Vince
Foster's subsequent suicide. The law firm of Swidler & Berlin sought to quash
a subpoena requesting notes taken during a meeting with Foster prior to his
death.

175. See id. Justice Sandra O'Connor, writing in dissent, purposed a
balancing test between the reputation and the state's interest in information.
176. Just to note: At least one article advancing a defamation of the dead

action has already included an analysis of Swidler. See Iryami, supra note 112,
at 1100-01.
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action, it will have to abide by the First Amendment doctrine of
Sullivan and its progeny'77 in the same manner as a regular
defamation matter. This is not the issue. What does trouble some
commentators opposing such an action is the potential chilling
effect it might have on historical and biographical writing. 7 ' As
noted above, historians need the broad liberty for error when
writing since they usually are not able to interview their subjects.' 79
Consequently, Andy Rooney of"60 Minutes" chastised this liberty
as slack and argued that the prohibition of defamation suits for the
dead allowed historians to be unabashedly irresponsible. 8 ' His
gripe concerned Oliver Stone's rearrangement of historical facts to
Thus, this
meet the needs of his story in the movie "JFK."''
argument suggests that a cause of action for defaming the dead
would not so much "chill" historical reporting, as it would serve as
a check and thereby preserve its legitimacy.
Although scholars have identified legitimate interests urging for
a cause of action, common law courts have not budged on the
issue.'
Added to this, jurisdictions with criminal libel statutes
have seen a steady decline in prosecutions and, more severe, recent
attacks as to their constitutionality.'83 With this in mind, lifting the
no defamation of the dead rule is not the best way to reconcile the
disparate treatment of the dead. In quest for a uniform treatment,
it seems more appropriate to dismantle the notion of descendible
publicity rights.
Fact: There remains dissention between jurisdictions as to
Fact: There is some
whether publicity rights are devisable.8
confusion as to whether such rights are property or personal.'85

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
supra.
185.

See Section III-A supra.
See notes 13 8-40 and accompanying text supra.
See id.
See Iryami, supra note 112, at 1102.
See id.
See generally Brown, supra note 88; Iryami, supra note 112.
See Iryami, supra note 112, at 1109-11.
Compare Ohio and Tennessee, see notes 75-81 and accompanying text
See notes 52 -53 and accompanying text supra.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

33

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

330

DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XII:297

Given these "facts," descendible publicity rights are, if not
vulnerable, then at least less stable than the common law rule on
defamation of the dead. But this is not the only reason to target
publicity rights when forming a uniform treatment of the dead.
Placing celebrities' publicity rights in the public domain upon
death is better for society than passing these rights on the estate or
surviving relatives.
Remember that the "moral principle" for which publicity fights
are deemed descendible is the prohibition of unjust enrichment of
those who exploit that which they have not labored for.'86
However, this reasoning can only go so far. Yes, a merchandiser
can arguably profit from selling T-shits bearing Elvis's image. But
could not a similar type of "unjust enrichment" occur, when a
decedent's survivor exploits a name or likeness that only one
person who walked this earth worked hard to create?
A descendible right of publicity extends beyond the prohibition
of unjust enrichment, however. In Elvis Presley International,a
not-for-profit organization in support of Memphis hospitals was
enjoined from naming itself after Elvis. 87' This use of his name
was not an appropriation for commercial advantage, but rather a
dedication to him. Similarly, in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center,
the defendant was enjoined from producing a bust in honor and
memorial of the late, great Dr. King, Jr.'88 Thus, a descendible
right of publicity fails to make a distinction between appropriation
for a commercial advantage and dedication. One wonders how
much the city of New Orleans had to pay the surviving relatives of
Louis Armstrong in order to dedicate the city's airport in the jazz
legend's honor.
Under the guise of safeguarding against unjust enrichment,
devisable publicity rights have also encroached upon aspects of
creativity and expression. Consider the case of Estate ofPresley v.
Russen.'89 In this case a federal district court granted an injunction
against the defendant from further performing his "Big El Show"
186.
187.
188.
189.

See Madow, supra note 11, at 179.
See 733 S.W. 2d at 92.
See 296 S.E. 2d at 706.
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981).
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and thus held that impersonating a dead celebrity for profit is in
violation of the surviving right of publicity. 9 ' It is this overinclusive notion of "commercial advantage" not being balanced
against other meaningful interests, such as freedom of speech, that
have lead to some jurisdictions' hesitation in supporting a principle
that is "overwhelmed" by various legal problems.'91 Therefore, to
be rather blunt, the dead should stay dead. It is in society's best
interest to preclude all causes of action that arise after the victim
has died. The dead should not be allowed redress for attacks
against reputation while dead. Nor should their persona be legally
misappropriated. In other words, seal the tomb tight enough to
provide for the secure and soundless slumber of those deceased.
V.

CONCLUSION

Between a common law that has dictated a "no defamation of
the dead" policy and certain jurisdictions that allow causes actions
involving the personas of dead celebrities, the old axiom "one foot
in grave" is given an entirely new meaning. And then to add
wrongful death and survivability actions to mix, the dead are given
enough legal viability to make George Romero pale with fear.'9"
As citizens of this country we are given, for all intents and
purposes, unrestricted access to the legal system. With standing
and an appropriate cause, anyone can have their matter heard
before the bench. However, for the departed citizens, it depends.
It depends on the type of claim and it depends on what state it is
brought. Hence, sometimes their interests can be heard and
sometimes not. Now I realize that my words are rather overstated.
Of course, the dead do not literally have interests; they are dead. I
am merely being hyperbolic, in order to illustrate that the dead,
like it or not, are sometimes the subjects of extensive litigation
brought on behalf of their name by surviving relatives and estates.
190. See id. at 1352.
191. See generally Memphis Development, 616 F. 2d 959-60.
192. George Romero, as you may know, is most famous for his motion
picture series featuring the undead; its most notable installment was "Night of
the Living Dead." Universal Pictures, 1968.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

35

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

332

DEPA UL J ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XII:297

Therefore, it seems as though the legal system in this country is at
an appropriate point to reassess its treatment of the dead. My
proposal is that this treatment be uniform. Either give the
deceased the same legal rights extended to living citizens, or allow
them and, most importantly, their legal concerns to rest eternally in
peace. For the reasons provided in this paper, I advocate the latter.
(Sorry, Elvis but your spirit should live in your music, and only in
your music.)
William H. Binder*

J.D. Tulane Law School 2002; B.A., B.S. Miami University
(Ohio) 1998.
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